In this paper, general logic-systems are investigated. It is shown that there are infinitely many finite consequence operators defined on a fixed language L that cannot be generated from any finite logicsystem. It is shown that any set map C: P(L) → P(L) is a finite consequence operator if and only if it is defined by a general logic-system.
Introduction.
Usually, two types of consequential operators are investigated, the general and the finite (finitary, algebraic). In this paper, since the objects will not be embedded formally into a nonstandard structure, roman font will not be used for the informal mathematical symbols. Let L be a nonempty language, P be the power set operator and F the finite power set operator. For a nonempty language L, when a general logic-system or a consequence operator is said to be defined on L this means that they are defined on P(L). Definition 1.1. A mapping C: P(L) → P(L) is a general consequence operator (or closure operator) if for each X, Y ∈ P(L) (i) X ⊂ C(X) = C(C(X)) ⊂ L; and if (ii) X ⊂ Y , then C(X) ⊂ C(Y ). A consequence operator C defined on L is said to be finite (finitary, or algebraic 
Remark 1.2. The above axioms (i), (ii), (iii) are not independent. Indeed, (i), (iii) imply (ii). Hence, the finite consequence operators defined on a specific language form a subset of the general operators.
In (Herrmann, 2001) , Section 3, logic-systems for a nonempty language are defined by means of a nonempty finite collection of n-ary relations RI = {R 1 , . . . , R k }, the rules of inference, where each R i ⊂ L n , n ≥ 1. The set RI includes a possibly nonempty set R 1 , (defined as a unary relations, where (a) = a), and using this set along with an informally described algorithm deductions are obtain for each X ∈ P(L). It is shown there that each such logic-system generates a finite consequence operator C that yields the same deductions when C is applied to any X ∈ P(L). Since there are but finitely many rules of inference, define such a logicsystem as a finite logic-system and the set of rules RI as the finite rules of inference.
If RI is a finite or infinite set of n-ary relations, then RI is called the general rules of inference and the logic-system that uses such a RI is called a general logicsystem. The symbol RI also denotes the logic-system with its defined processes. As shown in the same manner as for a finite logic-system (Herrmann, 2001) , any nonempty general logic-system RI generates (defines) a finite consequence operator the consequences of which are the same as those obtained from RI.
General logic-systems.
In general, for any n ≥ 1, R n denotes a nonempty subset of L n . I note that the notion of "effectiveness" used in Herrmann (2001) can be removed and replaced with either choice or simple conditional statements.
For any consequence operator C generated by a logic-system RI, a R n ∈ RI applies trivially to X ⊂ L if using the algorithm described in Herrmann (2001) restricted to R n for members of X, there is no a ∈ L such that a / ∈ X ∪ C(∅). For any X ⊂ L, R 1 applies trivially to X since R 1 ⊂ C(∅). Also, if R n applies trivially to X ⊂ L, then R n applies trivially to each Y ⊂ X.
Consider the natural numbers IN and a nonempty language L N each member of which denotes a member of IN. In what follows, the defined standard symbolic forms for members of IN are used. For L N , let S f N be the set of all finite rules of inference as defined on L N and S N the set of all general rules of inference defined on L N . In all that follows, the superscript denotes the "arity" of a relation.
(1) (n = 1), R 1 = ∅.
(2) (n > 1), R n = {(a 1 , . . . , a i , . . . , a n )}, where a i = n 2 −n−4 2 +i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Theorem 2.2. If C is the finite consequence operator defined on L N by the infinite general logic-system RI, then there does not exist RI 1 ∈ S f N such that for, C 1 , its generated consequence operator, C 1 = C.
Proof. Let RI 1 ∈ S f N , C 1 be the finite consequence operator generated by RI 1 and C 1 = C. For such a C 1 , C 1 (∅) = C(∅) = ∅ (i.e. all unary relations are empty.) Since RI 1 ∈ S f N and C 1 ({0}) = {0, 1}, then RI 1 contains a nonempty p-ary relation, where p ≥ 2 is the maximum arity for all of the members of RI 1 . Let k > p and
From the definition of C, since no member of X appears as any coordinate in any R n ∈ RI, where n = k and for n = k they all appear as distinct coordinates, then for each Y ⊂ X such that |Y | = k − 2, if follows that for n ≥ 1, that R n applies trivially to Y . However, for such Y , C 1 (Y ) = C(Y ) = Y. Hence, for every n ≥ 1, R n ∈ RI 1 applies trivially to such Y . Thus, since X ⊂ C 1 (X) = C(X) = X, then there exists one or more R q , q ≥ k, that uses all members of X as coordinates and yields a finite step deduction that C 1 (X) = {a i | (a i = k 2 −k−4
This contradicts the definition of p and the result follows.
Corollary 2.2.1. There are infinitely many finite consequence operators that cannot be generated by a finite logic-system.
Proof. Simply change definition 2.1. For each m ∈ IN, (1) (n = 1), R 1 m = ∅.
(2) (n > 1), R n m = {(a 1 , . . . , a i )}, a i = m + n 2 −n−4
Let C be a finite consequence operator defined on nonempty L. Define C(∅) = R 1 . Next, for each ∅ = X ∈ F (L), let |X| = n. Then consider X = {x 1 , . . . , x n }. Define the corresponding (n + 1)-ary relation R n+1
Obviously, RI * is not unique and, although not necessary, for at least a countable language, RI * can be expressed in terms of one n-ary relation for each 0 < n ∈ IN. (Note: This definition is somewhat similar to the definition given by Los and Suszko (1958, p. 178) for general consequence operators on a sentential language.) Theorem 2.3. Let C be a finite consequence operator defined on nonempty L and RI * the general rules of reference as defined above for such a C. If C 1 is the finite consequence operator generated by RI * , then C 1 = C.
Proof. Recall that for two consequence operators, C ′ , C ′′ defined on L, C ′ ≤ C ′′ iff for each X ∈ P(L), C ′ (X) ⊂ C ′′ (X). Let C 1 be the finite consequence operator generated by RI * , X ∈ P(L), and x ∈ C 1 (X). If X = ∅, then by definition either {(a 1 , . . . , a m , y) | y ∈ C(A)} ∈ RI and x is obtained by deduction using R m+1 . Thus x ∈ C(A) = C(∅).
Let ∅ = X ∈ P(L), x ∈ C 1 (X) and x / ∈ C 1 (∅). Then there is some nonempty finite Y ⊂ X such that x ∈ C 1 (Y ). From the definition of RI, since x / ∈ C 1 (∅) there is some nonempty finite collection of {R n }, n > 1 such that x is deduced from, at least, one member of this collection. From the definition of each R n , n > 1, there is a nonempty finite Z ⊂ Y such that x ∈ C(Z) ⊂ C(X). Hence, C 1 ≤ C. Conversely, if x ∈ C(X), then there is some finite Y ⊂ X such that x ∈ C(Y ). If Y = ∅, x ∈ R 1 ⊂ C 1 (X). If |Y | = n ≥ 1, then by definition of C 1 , x ∈ C 1 (Y ) ⊂ C 1 (X). Thus, C ≤ C 1 . Hence, C 1 = C.
Generating logic-systems.
In the physical sciences, the set RI is usually not defined explicitly. In actual practice, a physical argument simply claims that a specific finite set of statements -the conclusions -(among other names) is "deduced" from another finite set of statements S. These statements S can contain members from a fixed set of statements A -a unary relation -where A can be further partitioned. The actual hypotheses H = S − A. (In formal logic, the A is the entire set of statements generated by the axioms.) The actual rules of the logic are not usually stated. It is assumed that after refinements via peer evaluation that the vast majority of the members of a specific science-community would accept the "derivation." It is obvious how one would construct a general RI from collections of such derivations. For example, let {h 1 , . . . , h n } ∪ {a n+1 , . . . , a n+k } = S, n ≥ 1, k ≥ 1, where H = {h 1 , . . . , h n }, {a n+1 , . . . , a n+k } ⊂ A and {b 1 , . . . , b m } = B is nontrivially deduced from S. Then one can construct a R n+k+1 ∈ RI that contains {(h 1 , . . . , h n , a n+1 , . . . , a n+k , x) | x ∈ B}. However, under our definition of how logic-systems are employed for deduction, many other relations can also generate each member of B. For example, consider {(h 1 , . . . , h n , a n+1 , . . . , a n+k , b 1 )} and {(b 1 , x) | x ∈ B}.Since there must be at the least one member in S for there to be any non-trivial deduction, then, for certain S, it might be discovered that the set B can be deduced from the set {h 1 } ∈ H and {a 1 } ∈ A. Hence, from the definition of logic-systems and how they are used to generate deductions, you could also have a 3-ary relation R 3 ∈ RI such that {(h 1 , a 1 , x) | x ∈ B} ⊂ R 3 . Consequently, in general for non-trivial deduction from premises, it is merely assumed that for any set X ∈ P(L), if there is nonempty B ∈ P(L), B ∩ X = ∅ and each member of B is claimed to be deduced from finitely many members of X, using finitely members of a auxiliary set A, then, at the least, there are n-ary relations in RI that contain members that generate the members of B according to the algorithm stated in Herrmann (2001) .
